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t Elizabeth J. Boalt Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Another version of this Commentary is being published in Germany as
part of a volume of essays in tribute to Professor Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, retired co-
director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, in
Hamburg.
I
Professor McCarthy and the Right of Publicity
In a recently published lecture,1 Professor J. Thomas McCarthy,
the leading academic exponent of the "right of publicity," has summa-
rized the present state of that burgeoning branch of intellectual prop-
erty law and defended both the doctrine generally and its recent
expansions. I offer here a sort of counter-lecture. I will focus on what
I perceive to be the growing conflict between the right of publicity and
freedom of speech, a problem to which Professor McCarthy, in my
view, gives insufficient attention and weight.2
What is the right of publicity? It is the right of a celebrity (or
other person) to prevent others from using his or her name, likeness,
or-in the view of Professor McCarthy and others-"identity" for
commercial purposes without a license.3 The right is now recognized
in some twenty-five states, either by statute or common law, or both.4
The right of publicity has recently received a strong endorsement,
coupled with a broad interpretation, from the American Law Institute
in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (Restatement).5
The right of publicity is limited to "commercial" uses of the celeb-
rity's name, likeness, or identity, which generally (but not exclusively)
means use in advertising, on merchandise, or in promotion or selling.6
Thus, the right generally does not reach uses that are deemed "news,"
"commentary," "entertainment," "fiction or nonfiction," and the like.7
So the right of publicity cannot be employed to prevent use of a celeb-
rity's name, picture, or identity in news reporting (even by the kind of
"newspapers" found at supermarket checkout stands), in jokes on tel-
evision talk shows or "Saturday Night Live," or in unauthorized "life
stories" of the celebrity on television or movie screens.
1. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The Human
Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
129 (1995) [hereinafter McCarthy Lecture].
2. See also Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30
TORT & INS. L.J. 635 (1995).
3. See McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 130; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46 (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4. McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 132. Some thirteen of those states recognize a
post mortem right of publicity-a right for dead celebrities-with the post mortem dura-
tions ranging from 10 to 100 years or no stated duration. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 9.5[A] (rev. 1995) [hereinafter MCCARTHY TREA-
TISE]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at 545 (reporters' note).
5. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §§ 46-49.
6. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §§ 46-49.
7. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 47.
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Professor McCarthy thus can state: "While some criticize the
right of publicity as posing the danger of invading our free speech
rights, in fact, for all practical purposes, the only kind of speech im-
pacted by the right of publicity is commercial speech-advertising.
'8 I
agree that we are talking mainly about advertising, but I do not agree
that therefore no danger is posed to free speech rights. Free speech in
advertising is my subject here.
II
The Expanding Scope of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity has been notably expanding in the subject
matter of its coverage. Initially limited (and still limited in many
states) to use of the celebrity's "name or likeness,"9 the right has been
extended by some courts and commentators-such as Professor Mc-
Carthy and the new Restatement-to other aspects, evocations, or "in-
dicia" of the celebrity's "identity."'" The court decision that probably
has gone furthest in this regard is the well-known 1992 ruling of the
Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals in White v. Samsung Electron-
ics America, Inc.," the "Vanna White" case.
Vanna White is famous as the "hostess" who turns letters on the
game board of "Wheel of Fortune," a very popular television game
show. White sued Samsung Electronics over a magazine ad that was
part of a series spoofing items of popular culture. Each ad showed an
item from today's popular culture and a Samsung electronics product,
placing both in the 21st century and, in the court's words, "hypothesiz-
ing outrageous future outcomes for the cultural items,"' 2 along with
the message that the Samsung product would still be around. This ad,
for Samsung VCRs, showed a set recognizable as that of the Wheel of
Fortune show over the caption, "Longest-running game show. 2012
A.D." On the set, dressed like Vanna White and turning letters on the
game board, was a female-shaped robot. The joke, apparently, was
that when Vanna White had been replaced by a robot, Samsung's
VCR would still be around to tape the show.
The court of appeals held, over dissents from both the panel deci-
sion and the denial of rehearing en banc,' 3 that while the robot in the
8. McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 131.
9. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at 539-41 (reporters' "note).
10. E.g., id. § 46, at 531; McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 130-31.
11. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
12. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
13. Judge Arthur Alarcon dissented from the decision of the three-judge panel, see
White, 971 F.2d at 1402, and Judge Alex Kozinski, joined by Judges Diarmuid O'Scannlain
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ad was not White's "likeness," a jury could find that the ad had in-
fringed her common-law right of publicity because it had "appropri-
ated," or "evoke[d]," her "identity.
14
Professor McCarthy agrees.15 He likewise defines the right of
publicity as protecting "identity."16 His test of infringement, more-
over, is "identifiability," which he defines broadly by the question:
"[c]an more than a de minimis number of ordinary viewers identify
the plaintiff by looking at (or listening to) the defendant's advertise-
ment?"'17 The new Restatement similarly defines the right of publicity
as protecting "the commercial value of a person's identity," and as
prohibiting the unconsented use of name, likeness, "or other indicia of
identity." 8
and Andrew Kleinfeld, wrote a blistering (and entertaining) dissent from the court's denial
of rehearing en banc. See White, 989 F.2d 1512.
14. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
15. See McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 136.
16. "The right of publicity is simply the right of every person to control the commer-
cial use of his or her identity." Id. at 135.
17. Id.
18. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 46. The legal authority for the right of publicity,
and particularly for its extension to cover "identity," is remarkable for its ghost-like qual-
ity. Professor McCarthy tells how "[bloth the concept and the label 'right of publicity'
were created" in 1953 in "the seminal Haelan baseball trading card case," in which the
Second Circuit ruled "that under the law of the state of New York there was something
called a 'right of publicity' that was separate and apart from the right of privacy." McCar-
thy Lecture, supra note 1, at 131; see Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Haelan, however, is no longer
good law. It has been repudiated by decisions of New York's highest court holding that the
right of privacy in New York subsumes the right of publicity and is entirely statutory.
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984); Howell v.
New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993). The "seminal" decision was thus a
bad seed.
Meanwhile, the drafters of the RESTATEMENT, in support of their black-letter rule
covering the celebrity's "identity," rely-three times-on the 1977 decision of New York's
intermediate appellate court in the Guy Lombardo case. See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at
539-41 (reporters' note). That case held that bandleader Guy Lombardo's "public person-
ality as Mr. New Year's Eve" had been appropriated, and his common-law right of public-
ity infringed, by a television commercial showing another big band playing Auld Lang Syne
on New Year's Eve. Lombardo, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664. Lombardo, too, has been overruled
by the subsequent decisions of the New York Court of Appeals holding that there is no
common-law right of publicity in New York. Stephano, 474 N.E. 580; Howell, 612 N.E.2d
699. These decisions make clear that New York law protects only the attributes of "name,
portrait or picture" listed in its statute (N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (McKinney 1992)), and
not the celebrity's "identity." Seldom has a legal doctrine been constructed, and expanded,
on such a phantom foundation.
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III
The Right of Publicity, Commercial Speech, and the
First Amendment
A. The Nature of Advertising Speech
Since the right of publicity typically involves advertising, any dan-
ger this tort may pose to freedom of speech depends on what one
thinks of advertising as speech. Professor McCarthy doesn't think
much of it. For him, "the primary message of any advertisement is
'buy,' and that makes it commercial speech." 19 For me, recognition of
advertising as commercial speech is the beginning, not the end, of the
inquiry.
An advertisement indeed is designed to sell something, but "buy"
is not its only message. Advertisers need to attract attention and rise
above the clutter of competing ads; in their efforts to do so, they seek
to interest, inform, and entertain their audience. The volume of ad-
vertising speech obviously is vast, and so is the public impact. Ads
frequently provoke controversy over the roles depicted and messages
conveyed, and have entered into our political debate and permanent
political lexicon ("Where's the beef?").2" Ads also themselves have
used political themes and spoofed politicians.21 They will spoof popu-
19. McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 137.
20. See, e.g., Joan Ryan, An Odd Message in Nike's Santa Ad, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15,
1994, at Al, concerning a Nike commercial showing basketball star Dennis Rodman "bul-
lying Santa Claus" into giving him a pair of new shoes. The general manager of an NBA
basketball team was quoted as saying about the ad:
What kind of message is that?... That it doesn't matter what you do? That the
rules don't apply? That you don't need discipline? Everything is fine if you get
enough rebounds? I was offended by this both as a basketball man and an Afri-
can American.
Id. at Al, A23. See also the writer's observation: "Television commercials are as much a
part of pop culture as the shows during which they air." Id. at A23. This is not unique to
America; consider Europe's controversy over Benetton ads, which are considered offensive
(and banned in Germany) because they address social issues in "shocking" ways. See Rich-
ard Meares, Ad Man Defends Notorious Benetton Campaign, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE,
Sept. 26, 1995 (quoting Oliviero Toscani, creative director for publicity at Benetton, as
stating at a London lecture, "There isn't a difference any more between advertising and
editorial," and reporting that he denied using "shock tactics to help sell sweaters" and
insisted it was "the other way around: he [was] using the money of commerce via advertis-
ing, the most powerful medium in the world, to force issues into the faces of people who
would otherwise ignore them").
21. See, e.g., Thomas R. King, America West's Schwarzkopf Ads Raise an Issue of Taste
for Some, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1991, at B6 (parody of General Schwarzkopf shortly after
end of Gulf War); Joanne Lipman, Quayle Attains Dubious Status as a Pitchman, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 17, 1992, at B1, B6 (ads poking fun at then-Vice President Dan Quayle during 1992
Presidential campaign); Stuart Elliott, Everyone Loves a Winner, and His Coattails, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993, at C4 (ads featuring President-elect Clinton; also commercial for Gen-
eral Mills presenting "self-described 'breakfast expert' who look[ed] and sound[ed] like
lar culture and its nonpolitical celebrities as well, if not prevented
from doing so by the right of publicity.22
Professor Michael Madow has pointed out that ihe right of pub-
licity enables celebrities to censor popular culture by refusing to li-
cense commercial uses of their identity that they do not like.23
Professor McCarthy replies: "Control over use of identity in advertis-
ing seems to me to be trivial when compared to the torrent of report-
ing that goes on in the non-advertising, reportorial media. 24 One
adjective that seems oddly applied to the volume of advertising is
"trivial." To let celebrities control all uses of their "identity" in adver-
tising is to let them control the way their image is presented in a very
large realm of public communication and popular culture.
Consider former U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle. While in of-
fice Quayle was the butt of many jokes-some in ads-over his spell-
ing difficulties with the word "potato. '25 After leaving office, Quayle
appeared voluntarily in a television commercial for potato chips;
shown to the huge audience watching the 1994 football Super Bowl.26
Political consultants called this self-mocking appearance "the perfect
thing for Quayle" and his political image.27 In Professor McCarthy's
apparent view, politicians like Quayle (or other celebrities) can use
advertising to convey an image or message that they like about them-
selves, while preventing others from using advertising to convey a dif-
ferent image or message about them. I doubt that the First
Ross Perot, complete with flip charts, colorful colloquialisms, and a toll-free '800'
number"); Stuart Elliot, AT&T's New Campaign Conjures Up Images from Recent History,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at D5 (ad evokes memories of Watergate with simulated news
report on "Rategate," including scene showing "a reporter in a parking garage for clandes-
tine meetings with shadowy sources-much as the mysterious source known only as Deep
Throat met with Mr. Woodward").
22. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, Television Provides the Yeast for Media-Savvy Campaigns
by Three Brewers, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1994, at C2 ("Three large brewers are all running
television commercials that are as much about television as they are about beer .... The
commercials seek to attract attention by mocking the familiar conventions of television:
soporific series, silly sports, tacky talk shows, breathless network promotions, earnest pub-
lic service announcements and, of course, commercials themselves."); Stuart Elliott, An
Offbeat Corporate Campaign Is the Latest Homage to Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1994, at C7 (commercials spoofing Citizen Kane and The Graduate called "emblematic of
the cross-pollination between advertising and popular films").
23. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 238-39 (1993).
24. McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 140.
25. See Lipman, supra note 21, at B1, B6.
26. See Maureen Dowd, Selling Chips? Or Is It Quayle? It's All a Blur, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1994, at 6.
27. Id.
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Amendment, with its content-neutrality principle,28 allows a rule of
law to close off the entire advertising medium to all but one point of
view about a public person.29
B. The Law of Advertising Speech
The United States Supreme Court has held that advertising and
other forms of "commercial speech" are protected by the First
Amendment, but less so than other protected speech.3 ° The Court has
justified the protection given to advertising on two grounds. The orig-
inal theory, and still the primary one, is that advertising warrants First
Amendment protection for its very function of "propos[ing] a com-
mercial transaction" 31 -what Professor McCarthy calls the "primary
message" of "'buy.' ' 32 This protection exists, the Court has said, be-
cause the ad's sales pitch "informs the numerous private decisions that
drive the [free enterprise] system., 33 More recently, and more rele-
vant here, the Court has relied not on the ad's "commercial proposal,"
but rather on what has been called its "rhetorical matter. ' 34 Thus, the
Court has said that "[a]dvertising, though entirely commercial, may
often carry information of import to significant issues of the day,"35
and that "[t]he commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our so-
cial and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information
flourish. "36
On these foundations, the Court has built a First Amendment ju-
risprudence of "commercial speech" that, although famously inconsis-
tent in application, 37 does adhere to a single test for appraising the
constitutionality of laws restricting commercial speech. This "Central
28. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991).
29. Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994) (city "totally foreclosed
[the] medium [of residential signs] to political, religious, or personal messages").
30. E.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
31. Id. at 421.
32. McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 137; see also supra text accompanying note 20.
33. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995); see also Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U.S. at 421 n.17.
34. Theodore F. Haas, Storehouse of Starlight: The First Amendment Privilege to Use
Names and Likenesses in Commercial Advertising, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 540, 550-51
(1986).
35. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 421 n.17 (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 364 (1977)).
36. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). The Court recently quoted an Ameri-
can colonial history of 1810 stating that advertisements "are well calculated to enlarge and
enlighten the public mind." Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 421 n.17; see also the
television commercials noted supra notes 20-22.
37. Compare, e.g., Fane, 507 U.S. 761, with, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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Hudson" test38 provides that commercial speech may be freely regu-
lated,39 or even banned,4" if it is "false, deceptive, or misleading",4'
but commercial speech otherwise can be restricted only if "the State
shows that the restriction directly and materially advances a substan-
tial state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.
42
It is also apparently the law that restrictions on commercial
speech will be held invalid if they violate some independent First
Amendment rule that applies to the speech in question. The Court
has tested commercial speech for undue vagueness,43 for example,
and for the "content-neutral[ity]" required of a "time, place, or man-
ner" regulation."
Professor McCarthy does not apply any of these First Amend-
ment tests to the right of publicity, either in his lecture or in his valua-
ble treatise on the subject.45 The Ninth Circuit likewise, both in White
and in its recent decision in Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.,
46
has not seen the right of publicity as calling for examination under the
Supreme Court's doctrine of commercial speech. But since the right
of publicity deals with advertising, which surely is commercial speech,
the Supreme Court could well find application of that doctrine appro-
priate.47 I therefore proceed to consider how the Court's law of com-
mercial speech might apply to the right of publicity.
4
38. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
39. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1995).
40. Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2088 (1994).
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
43. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 347 (1986).
44. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 428-29.
45. MCCARTHY TREATISE, supra note 4, passim.
46. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., No. 94-55597, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1778 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1996).
47. Cf. Judge Kozinski's dissent in White, 989 F.2d at 1520-21 ("The panel majority
doesn't even purport to apply the Central Hudson test, which the Supreme Court devised
specifically for determining whether a commercial speech restriction is valid.").
48. At the threshold, Professor Kwall challenges any First Amendment defense on the
ground that the Central Hudson test does not protect commercial speech that's misleading,
and, she argues, infringements of the right of publicity are often misleading with regard to
the celebrity's endorsement of the product or association with it. Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Anal-
ysis, 70 IND. L. REV. 47, 75-79 (1994). Thus, Professor Kwall points out, in White the court
held that White had a claim for false representation under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 1125a) as well as a right-of-publicity claim, a decision that "leaves open the door for
finding consumer deception based on a wide variety of unauthorized uses of an individual's
persona." Id. at 76.
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Applying the First Amendment to the Right of
Publicity
A. Is the "Identification" Test Too Broad or Too Vague?
One question would be whether the scope of the right of public-
ity, as defined by Professor McCarthy's "identification" test or by a
rule against "appropriating identity," is consistent with First Amend-
ment prohibitions against undue breadth and undue vagueness in
rules of law restricting speech. What does it mean that viewers can
"identify the plaintiff" from the ad, or that the advertiser has
"evoke[d]" a celebrity's "identity"? Judge Kozinski, dissenting from
the denial of en banc rehearing in White, read the court's test to mean
that "every famous person now has an exclusive right to anything that
reminds the viewer of her."49 If the rule is this broad-which Profes-
sor McCarthy does not deny5 -it may raise questions of undue
breadth under the First Amendment. As Judge Kozinski exclaimed:
"[N]ot allowing any means of reminding people of someone? That's a
speech restriction unparalleled in First Amendment law."51
Consider an example. In an earlier article on this subject, I hy-
pothesized-I thought implausibly-that Ford Motor Company, dur-
ing the O.J. Simpson trial, might offer a promotion on white Broncos
called the "Brentwood Special."52 I was not far off. During the trial a
The short answer is that infringement of the right of publicity requires no deception or
misrepresentation. See McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 135 ("deception or false en-
dorsement is not required"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 46 cmt. b, at 530 ("Proof of
deception or consumer confusion is not required .... "). But where deception can be
found on the same facts, as the court ruled was the case in White, does the defendant's ad
thereby lose First Amendment protection that it otherwise would have against the right-of-
publicity claim? Since the deceptiveness is irrelevant to the right-of-publicity claim, one
might think not. At the least, the two claims should be separated with regard to any relief
awarded; misrepresentation should not justify damages on the publicity claim. And if a
finding of misrepresentation is to divest First Amendment protection, that finding should
be made by a court, not a jury, and with constitutional safeguards. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510-
11 (1984). Beyond that, in stating that "misleading" commercial speech is not protected,
the Supreme Court seems to have had in mind relatively simple, monolithic assertions that
are "inherently misleading," In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982), rather than relatively
complex productions such as the Samsung ad in White, in which any representation that
White had authorized the ad would be only a small part of the total communication.
49. White, 989 F.2d at 1515 ("After all, that's all Samsung did: It used an inanimate
objection to remind people of White, to 'evoke' [her identity].").
50. See McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 136-37.
51. White, 989 F.2d at 1519; see also id. at 1517 ("Should White have the exclusive right
to something as broad and amorphous as her 'identity'?").
52. Barnett, supra note 2, at 636. Simpson, of course, lived in the Brentwood section
of Los Angeles and drove a white Bronco.
1996]
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Ford dealer near San Francisco ran a radio commercial that included
the line, "[e]very white Bronco on the lot subject to plea bargain-
ing."53 This ad, and others based on the Simpson saga,54 would seem
to meet Professor McCarthy's test of "identifiability"; more than a de
minimis number of ordinary viewers presumably could "identify" O.J.
Simpson by listening to the ad.
But would the First Amendment permit a court to hold this ad-
vertiser liable for infringing Simpson's right of publicity? I doubt it.
That would impose liability for a reference, albeit in advertising, to a
news event that pervaded the public's consciousness. Such a ruling
would approach thought control.55 It would block advertisers from
communicating to their audience about contemporaneous facts, in ap-
parent violation of the Supreme Court's dictum that "all facts-scien-
tific, historical, biographical, and news of the day" 56 are "'part of the
public domain available to every person.'
' 57
Such protection for a celebrity's "identity" also might violate a
First Amendment principle barring legal control of ideas.58 A celeb-
rity's free-floating "identity" may be nothing more than the "idea" of
the celebrity. This may be particularly true when the "identity" being
conveyed transcends that of the individual celebrity and evokes a
more general type, or "generic celebrity," that the individual has come
to signify.59
Professor McCarthy replies to the "generic celebrity" defense in
White by asserting that "this is not just any game show robot, this is a
53. Commercial for Novato Ford (KCBS radio broadcast, Aug. 23, 1995). Who knows
what ads ran in Los Angeles?
54. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at B6 (ad for mystery novel using line, "Acquit
O.J.-What the hey? L.A. D.O.A."); Herb Caen, OD'd on OJ, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995,
at A14 (reporting sign in dessert-and-juice cafe: "Today only-free O.J. with each $6 mil-
lion purchase" ($6 million being estimated cost of trial)); cf. Jeff Pelline, "Squeeze the
Juice" Coming to a Toy Store Near You, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1995, at A6 (board game
called "Squeeze the Juice" based on Simpson trial, in which players pose as Simpson de-
fense attorneys; Simpson reportedly "has sued to block such endeavors."). Indeed he has,
at least against some blatant endeavors. See B.J. Palermo, Simpson's Vendor Case Is Dis-
missed, S.F. DAILY J., Mar. 14, 1996, at 3 (reporting dismissals, by settlement or at plain-
tiff's request, of Simpson's suits against "sellers of T-shirts, kitchen magnets, and other
souvenirs bearing his name and image").
55. "Where does White get this right to control our thoughts?" White, 989 F.2d at 1519
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
56. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
57. Id. (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir.
1981)).
58. See, e.g, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985); Barnett, supra note 2, at 646.
59. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the
Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1254-55 (1986).
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Vanna White robot. '60 But any creature-person, robot, or gorilla-
turning letters on a television game show would remind people of
Vanna White. If the person of Vanna White has become inextricable
from the idea of a game show hostess (or host), it would seem that, by
analogy to the "merger" principle in copyright law, advertisers must
be allowed to refer to the person in order to convey the idea.6'
If Professor McCarthy's "identification" test does not go so far as
to reach any "reminder" of the celebrity, the problem then is that one
cannot know how far it does go. Nothing in the concept of "identifica-
tion"-or of "identity"-permits drawing a clear line short of that ex-
treme. The test thus gains in vagueness what it loses in breadth. The
White court in fact refused to make its liability rule more specific pre-
cisely because it did not want advertisers to know how far, short of the
extreme, they could go.62 The court's rule-and Professor McCar-
thy's-thus seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's concern to
avoid undue vagueness and undue breadth in rules of law restricting
speech.63
B. Reconciling the Right of Publicity with the First Amendment Through
a Defense of Fair Use
Various proposals have been advanced for reconciling the right of
publicity with the First Amendment.64 In his treatise (though not in
his lecture), Professor McCarthy recognizes the need for reconcilia-
tion---but only in cases of "media use," in contrast to use in advertis-
ing.65 Where advertising is concerned, Professor McCarthy declares
that the "commercial speech" defense to right-of-publicity claims is
"patently specious. '66
In the area of "media use," Professor McCarthy's proposed
means of resolving the conflict would reject systematic defenses such
60. McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 138.
61. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-05 (1879).
62. "A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed only through the use
of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges the clever advertising
strategist to come up with the tenth." White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
63. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
64. See sources cited in Barnett, supra note 2, at 637 n.18.
65. "In some cases of media use of human identity, there is indeed a conflict with the
first amendment." MCCARTHY TREATISE, supra note 4, §§ 8-37, -38.
66. Professor McCarthy labels speech a "media use" if it has a "reasonable relation-
ship with the normal content of the 'media': news, commentary on public issues, fiction,
and entertainment." MCCARTHY TREATISE, supra note 4, § 7-2. In contrast, a use is "com-
mercial" if it appears "in advertising or promotion or in connection with the actual goods
or services themselves." Id. For "commercial" uses, Professor McCarthy sees virtually no
potential conflict with the First Amendment, calling the "commercial speech" defense "pa-
tently specious." Id. § 7-3, -4.
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as fair use. Rather, he says, "[t]he primary difficulty is pinning down
the relevant free speech principles," and "[t]he balance must be labo-
riously hacked out case by case."67 Whether applied only to "media
use" or to advertising as well, it is not clear how this approach would
work. One relevant free speech principle would be the Central Hud-
son test.68 Applied directly to the facts of each case, however, that
test might produce no "balance" at all. When the state's interest lies
in protecting the commercial value of the celebrity's identity, the
broadest rule favoring the celebrity might be considered "no more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve that interest. '69 And if the balance is
to be "hacked out case by case," it is hard to see what might trump the
celebrity's claim, other than a problematic judgment by the court
based directly on the value of the speech.
I think a more developed and specific test is needed to protect
the First Amendment interest in right-of-publicity cases. Like other
commentators,70 and some courts,71 I would find a model for one such
test in the "fair use" doctrine of copyright law. Unlike other propos-
als for more developed First Amendment defenses to the right of pub-
licity,72 this one starts with a constitutional justification. The U.S.
Copyright Act, a statute contemplated by the Constitution and dating
from the first Congress, confers rights that have long been limited ju-
dicially, and are now limited in the statute itself, by a defense of fair
use. 73 No reason appears why the right of publicity, a recent creation
of state law, cannot likewise be accommodated to a defense of fair use.
Under Central Hudson, when one asks whether denial of a fair use
defense is "necessary" to serve the state's interest in the right of pub-
licity, the answer must be that it is not-that if copyright law can toler-
ate such a defense, so can the right of publicity.
A fair use defense has other advantages as well. It would bring
with it the benefits of precedent, including an extensive body of judi-
cial decisions, a statutory codification, and a resulting stock of analo-
gous fact situations and judicial trails blazed. Moreover, the four fair
67. MCCARTHY TREATISE, supra note 4, § 8-38.
68. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980); see supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
69. Id.
70. See sources cited in Barnett, supra note 2, at 649 n.111.
71. See id.; Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 868 F. Supp. 1266
(N.D. Okla. 1994), appeal filed (10th Cir).
72. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 48, at 86-88, 110 n.302 (proposing sui generis balancing
approach taking account of potential for decreased incentives, consumer deception, unjust
enrichment, and whether plaintiff's objection is "morally based" or "economically based").
73. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1995); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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use "factors" codified in the U.S. Copyright Act,74 and the judicial
gloss put on them, prominently include considerations that should be
highly relevant in fashioning limits on the right of publicity: assess-
ments of "how commercial" is the use, of the presence of "transforma-
tive" elements such as parody and satire, and of the impact on the
plaintiff's economic interests.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ,'7 the Supreme Court high-
lighted these considerations in deciding that a parody can be a fair use
in copyright law although it is produced for profit and in that sense is
"commercial." Campbell did not involve a use in advertising, which
admittedly would be even more "commercial."76 But "commerciality"
is only one factor, indeed only part of one factor,77 in the Copyright
Act's four-factor test for fair use. Much of the Court's discussion of
parody as fair use in copyright law would be useful in a right-of-pub-
licity case.78
Several trial courts in right-of-publicity cases have recognized de-
fenses modeled after fair use in copyright law.79 While only one of
those decisions upheld the defense on the facts presented, this was the
74. The four factors are: (1) "the purpose and character of the use, including whether
it is commercial or for nonprofit educational purposes"; (2) "the nature of the copyrighted
work"; (3) "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole"; and (4) the effect on the "potential market" or "value" of the
copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1995). The preamble to § 107 gives
examples of fair use purposes that include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching"
and "research." Id.
75. 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994).
76. See id. at 1174 ("The use, for example, of a copyrighted work to advertise a prod-
uct, even in a parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use
enquiry, than the sale of a parody for its own sake ....") (dictum); Barnett, supra note 2, at
650-53.
77. The first factor asks not only how "commercial" is the use, but also how "trans-
formative," as in the case of satire. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 ("[Tlhe more transforma-
tive the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.").
78. See, e.g., id. at 1171-73 (parody and other "transformative" uses); id. at 1173-74
(degree of "commerciality"); id. at 1175 ("nature of... work," including contrast between
"creative works" and "bare factual compilations"); id. ("'quantity and value of the materi-
als used"' (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)));
1177-78 (impact on market).
79. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 2358 n.18, 1359 n.32 (D.N.J. 1981); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber,
12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2280, 2282 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986) ("Fair use can provide a reason-
able, systematic, and consistent frame of reference for evaluating right of publicity mat-
ters."); Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla.
1994).
only case decided since Campbell, and it relied squarely on
Campbell.8"
The fair use defense is indeed far from simple and predictable in
copyright law itself, as Professor McCarthy points out.81 Having an
established body of factual and legal precedents to work from, how-
ever, provides more predictability than having none. 82 And where
legal limits on speech are concerned, predictability is important.
C. Two Potential Applications of the Fair Use Defense
1. Sports Statistics
By way of example, let me consider two kinds of celebrity refer-
ences that might be protected by a First Amendment or fair use de-
fense, but that Professor McCarthy apparently would not protect.
One involves sports statistics: factual information about records set or
other performances by athletes. Professor McCarthy evidently would
recognize no fair use defense for such a statement in advertising.83
Nor is he alone; the Ninth Circuit recently has taken the same
position.
In Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp. ,84 Kareem Abdul-Jab-
bar, the former basketball player, sued over the use of his former
name, Lew Alcindor, in an Oldsmobile television commercial. Aired
during the NCAA men's basketball tournament, the commercial fea-
tured a basketball "trivia quiz." It was introduced by a screen stating,
"You're Talking to the Champ," and asked: "Who holds the record for
80. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1272.
81. MCCARTHY TREATISE, supra note 4, § 8-37. But cf id. § 8-97 (invoking "copyright
defense of fair use as a guideline" in dealing with parody and satire); -102 (analogy be-
tween right of publicity and copyright in context of parody and satire "seems particularly
apt").
82. This seems a fatal flaw in the creative and complex balancing approach for right-
of-publicity cases devised by Professor Kwall. See Kwall, supra note 48, at 86-88, 110 n.302.
Her approach would require the courts to invent an entire new constitutional defense to a
tort, much as the Supreme Court did for libel in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), rather than simply adapt the fair use defense that already exists for a comparable
tort, copyright infringement.
83. He states that the right of publicity "applies to the long distance runner who won
an Olympic medal twenty years ago, is now selling insurance in Iowa and whose name and
accomplishments are printed today on a box of breakfast cereal to help sell the cereal."
McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 141. (It is possible that by the plural "accomplish-
ments," Professor McCarthy means not a single medal-winning performance but a whole
career's worth, in which case the defense would be weaker. But see MCCARTHY TREATISE,
supra note 4, § 7-3 ("Does the highly attenuated constitutional protection given 'commer-
cial speech' ever justify an infringement of the Right of Publicity? The answer seems to be
'hardly ever, almost never."')).
84. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., No. 94-5597, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1778 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1996).
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being voted the most outstanding player of this tournament?" The
answer then appeared in printed words on the screen: "Lew Alcindor,
UCLA, '67, '68, '69." The commercial went on to ask, "Has any car
made the 'Consumer Digest's Best Buy' list more than once?," and
answered, "The Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight," which has "made that list
three years in a row." The commercial concluded with the printed
message, "A Definite First Round Pick," accompanied by a voice-over
saying, "It's your money," and then a final printed message, "Demand
Better, 88 by Oldsmobile. 85
Abdul-Jabbar sued for false endorsement under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act86 and for infringement of California's statutory and
common law rights of publicity. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, largely on the ground that Abdul-Jabbar
had "abandoned" his former name. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
abandonment ruling and held that Abdul-Jabbar had a case for trial
on both the Lanham Act and right-of-publicity claims.
On these facts, the commercial arguably went beyond using the
name simply as a sports statistic or historical fact. By using the terms
"champ" and "first round pick," and perhaps also by the commonality
of winning an award "three years in a row," General Motors, as the
Ninth Circuit held, "arguably attempted to 'appropriate the cachet of
one product for a different one,' if not also to 'capitalize on consumer
confusion."' 87 Abdul-Jabbar thus may have had a case for the jury on
his false-endorsement claim under the Lanham Act. His right-of-pub-
licity claim,' likewise, may have been rightly sent to the jury on the
question whether the name was used in a way that went beyond stat-
ing the historical fact of awards won by Alcindor, and that linked the
player with the product in a way that attempted to appropriate some
of Alcindor's "cachet" for Oldsmobile.
But while the Ninth Circuit's holding on the facts of Abdul-Jab-
bar may have been correct, the court's reasoning and language went
distinctly further than the facts required. On the Lanham Act claim,
the court did rely on the "champ" and "first round pick" language as
implying sponsorship or endorsement and thus establishing "a ques-
tion of fact as to whether GMC is entitled to a fair use defense" under
trademark law.88 But the court's opinion, though not entirely clear,
also seems to hold that no such language linking Alcindor and Olds-
85. Id. at *2-3.
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125a (West Supp. 1995).
87. Abdul-Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *15 (quoting New Kids on the Block
v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)).
88. Id. at *15.
mobile was necessary. In distinguishing the Ninth Circuit's decision in
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.,89 which in-
volved the use of the plaintiffs' name in readership polls conducted by
the defendant newspapers, the court said:
... [U]se of celebrity endorsements in television commercials is so
well established by commercial custom that a jury might find an im-
plied endorsement in General Motors' use of the celebrity's name in
a commercial, which would not inhere in a newspaper poll....
Many people may assume that when a celebrity's name is used in a
television commercial, the celebrity endorses the product adver-
tised. Likelihood of confusion as to endorsement is therefore a
question for the jury.
90
This seems to say that any unconsented use of a "celebrity's name" in
a "television commercial" makes a jury case for false endorsement
under Section 43(a). 91
On the right-of-publicity claims, the court was no less absolute. It
rejected any sort of fair use defense, even (apparently) as a question
of fact for the jury (though it had allowed such a defense to the Lan-
ham Act claim).92 In reply to GM's argument that its use of the name
Lew Alcindor was "incidental" and therefore not actionable, the court
called the argument "irrelevant," apparently because the cases relied
on by GM involved magazines or newspapers. 93 The court made no
attempt to explain why the use of a celebrity's name in advertising
could not also be "incidental." The court's only relevant explanation
was:
While Lew Alcindor's basketball record may be said to be
"newsworthy," its use is not automatically privileged. GMC used
the information in the context of an automobile advertisement, not
in a news or sports account. Hence GMC is not protected by sec-
89. 971 F.2d 302.
90. Abdul-Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *14.
91. Such a ruling provides its own justification. If "[m]any people may assume" that
use of a celebrity's name means the celebrity has been paid, then any such use without
payment becomes a false representation and actionable under § 43(a). One might have
thought that, rather than shape the law to embody popular impressions about the law (or
the court's notion of what those impressions may be), the court would decide as a matter of
law whether the use of the name implies endorsement, and let popular impressions be
shaped by the law. As has been said of the rather similar Australian law: there is an "inevi-
table circularity in impressing a public perception of what the law of actionable misrepre-
sentation requires into service as the benchmark of what is in fact an actionable
misrepresentation." Michael Pendleton, Character Merchandising and the Proper Scope of
Intellectual Property, 1 INTELL. PROP. J. 242, 242 (1990).
92. See Abdul-Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *15.
93. Abdul Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *26-27 (citing Namath v. Sports Il-
lustrated, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), and Montana v. San Jose Mercury News,
Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).
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tion 3344(d) rof the California Civil Code (the state's right-of-pub-
licity statute)]. 94
Thus the court apparently held that any use of "information"
such as an athletic record with the athlete's name, when done in an
"advertisement," can claim no defense under California's right-of-
publicity law.95 While the court said such use was not "automatically"
privileged, it seems to have left no room for any privilege, automatic
or not. In contrast to the court's treatment of Abdul-Jabbar's Lanham
Act claim, where it held there was "a question of fact as to whether
GMC is entitled to a fair use defense, "96 on the right-of-publicity
claims the court called the incidental-use defense "irrelevant" and said
nothing about any fair use or constitutional defense to be given to the
jury. Nowhere did the court mention-even to dismiss, as it had done
in White97-the First Amendment's protection of "commercial
speech."98
Abdul-Jabbar thus seems to say that there is no defense to a Cali-
fornia right-of-publicity claim-at least not as a matter of law, and
apparently not even as a question for the jury-based on using the
celebrity's name as a "newsworthy" fact or "information," when the
use is in an "advertisement." Although Abdul-Jabbar involved a tele-
vision ad, the court spoke of using the information in "the context of
an ... advertisement,"9 9 which apparently covers advertisements in
any medium. 1°° And while Abdul-Jabbar involved use of a name, the
court's ruling apparently governs any reference to a celebrity; the
court stressed again, as it had in. White, that California's common law
right of publicity "is not limited to the appropriation of name or like-
ness," but "[t]he key issue is appropriation of the plaintiff's iden-
94. Abdul-Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *26-27.
95. While the quoted passage mentions only the statutory claim under Civil Code
§ 3344(d), the court discussed the statutory and common law publicity claims together and
said nothing about any greater defense to the common law claim. See id. at *13-27.
96. Id. at *15.
97. White, 971 F.2d at 1401 n.3.
98. It is puzzling that Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, who joined Judge Kozinski's dissent
from the denial of rehearing in White, 989 F.2d 1512, silently joined the majority in Abdul-
Jabbar. The two opinions seem inconsistent in several respects. For example, where Judge
Kozinski complained that the White majority "doesn't even purport to apply the Central
Hudson test" for commercial speech, White, 989 F.2d at 1520, the Abdul-Jabbar panel not
only failed to apply that test, but did not cite or refer to it or say anything about commer-
cial speech.
99. Abdul-Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *26-27.
100. The Lanham Act holding, in contrast, spoke of "television commercials." Abdul-
Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *14. One may wonder, though, what basis there is
for distinguishing them from advertisements in other media, either generally or with re-
spect to "use of celebrity endorsements."
tity."' O' There is also no apparent reason why the court's absolutist
approach in Abdul-Jabbar would not apply to political celebrities, °2
and hold advertisers liable for using facts or information about them
without their permission.
1 0 3
The Ninth Circuit notwithstanding, I think the unconsented use
of a famous person's name or other attribute as part of a purely fac-
tual or historical report, even in an advertisement, can claim a fair use
defense to a right-of-publicity suit. Even in an advertisement, facts
are facts. And as the Supreme Court has said, "all facts-scientific,
historical, biographical, and news of the day"'1 4 are "'part of the pub-
lic domain available to every person."' 05 As Professor Kwall has put
it:
Right-of-publicity plaintiffs do not have a property interest in
information about themselves. The appropriation by a defendant of
playing statistics and other facts in the public domain is very differ-
ent from the appropriation of an individual's name, likeness, or
other attributes protected by the right of publicity. Balanced
against a publicity plaintiff's virtually nonexistent property interest
in such information is society's substantial interest in public dissemi-
nation of information. This societal interest is equally compelling
regardless of the particular vehicle in which the information is
disseminated.'
0 6
Support for this view can be found in Montana v. San Jose Mer-
cury News, Inc.10 7 The case involved a newspaper's sale of posters
101. Abdul-Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778 at *17.
102. See White, 989 F.2d at 1519 n.29 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of en banc
rehearing). Political celebrities might be distinguished on the Lanham Act claim, on the
ground that "[m]any people" might not assume that they were "endors[ing] the product
advertised" or being paid for their appearance. Abdul-Jabbar, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1778
at *14. California's right-of-publicity law, however, requires no suggestion of "endorse-
ment or association." Id. at *19 (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 232
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
103. This might ban, for example, the commercials spoofing then-Vice President
Quayle over his spelling difficulties, see Dowd, supra note 26, as well as the billboard for a
Chinese food delivery service that showed a photo of then-Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl
Gates, when he was refusing to quit in the wake of the L.A. riots, with the text, "When you
can't leave the office. Or won't." See White, 989 F.2d at 1519 n.29 (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of en banc rehearing).
104. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
105. Id. (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir.
1981). The complete quote reads:
Census data therefore do not trigger copyright because these data are not "origi-
nal" in the constitutional sense. Nimmer para. 2.03 [E]. The same is true of all
facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day. "[T]hey may not
be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person."
Id. (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981).
106. Kwall, supra note 48, at 91.
107. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (1995).
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reproducing the front page of its Super Bowl "souvenir section" bear-
ing a photo of football star Joe Montana. In rejecting Montana's
right-of-publicity claim, the court relied on two First Amendment
grounds. One was the newspaper's "constitutional right to promote
itself by reproducing its ... articles or photographs."1" 8 The other was
that "the posters themselves report[ed] newsworthy items of public
interest."' 9 Such reporting of newsworthy items of public interest
would still exist, and should still warrant First Amendment protection,
when done in an advertisement for a product other than a newspaper.
The same conclusion can be reached through the fair use analysis.
Under the first of the four fair use factors in the Copyright Act, "the
purpose and character of the use,"110 the use of the sports statistic "to
advertise a product""' would be plainly "commercial" and hence
count against fair use."12 But one factor cannot dictate the out-
come,113 and even under the first factor the use would be "transforma-
tive," because the commercial is a new work. Under the second
factor, "the nature of the.., work," the Court in copyright cases has
contrasted fiction and other "creative works" with "bare factual com-
pilatiofns." 4 This factor would count against protection for the
purely historical fact that constitutes a sports statistic. Similarly (or
alternatively), the third factor, which looks at the "amount
taken"" 5-"in Justice Story's words, 'the quantity and value of the
materials used'"H 6 -could take account of the factual, constitution-
ally-protected nature of what was taken and of the need to use the
athlete's name in order to report the historical fact." 7 There would
remain the fourth factor, the effect on the celebrity's licensing market.
108. Id. at 643.
109. Id. The Abdul-Jabbar court, in discussing Montana, gave no indication that in
holding the posters protected because they "report newsworthy items of public interest,"
the California court relied on the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit panel suggested,
rather, that the result in Montana was based exclusively on Civil Code § 3344(d)'s exemp-
tion for news reports. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., No. 94-55597, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 1778, at *26 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1996).
110. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West 1994).
111. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994).
112. See id.
.113. Campbell, 114 S: Ct. at 1170-71; see Barnett, supra note 2, at 650-51.
114. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990).
115. Amount taken refers to "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole." Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175 (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(3) (1994)).
116. Id.
117. Cf New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1992) ("Such nominative use of a mark-where the only word reasonably avail-
able to describe a particular thing is pressed into service-lies outside the strictures of
trademark law.").
This would vary with the facts, but a factual use that simply reports
the celebrity's achievement and carries no implication of endorsement
ought not to "make it difficult for him to endorse other automobiles,"
as Abdul-Jabbar claimed. It might indeed make more valuable his
choosing of Toyota despite the ad by Oldsmobile, and in general
might simply increase the fame he has to sell.
The result might be different, however, if an ad used the athlete's
picture as well as (or without) his name. Under the second fair use
factor, the "amount taken," the use of a photo takes more of a person
than the use of his name, and at the same time is not indispensable to
communicating the factual information.118 This is not to say that use
of a celebrity's likeness may never be protected by a fair use de-
fense-only that, other things being equal, it can claim less protection
than use of the celebrity's name. 19
2. Parody
My second example of arguable fair use is parody, or spoofing, of
the celebrity. Professor McCarthy, like the Vanna White court, flatly
rejects any "parody defense" for advertising:
My problem with a parody defense in an advertisement is raised by
this question: what is the primary message of an advertisement? I
think that the primary message of any advertisement is "buy," and
that makes it commercial speech. 120
If one recognizes that commercial speech is not without constitu-
tional protection, and that a fair use defense is required, several ele-
ments of the Supreme Court's fair use analysis in Campbell can be
118. See KwalI, supra note 48 (plaintiff's property right "stronger than it is where infor-
mation alone is being appropriated"); see generally id. at 92-100. German law recognizes
the distinction. Section 22 of the German Copyright Act of 1907 (KUG) provides that a
person's picture may be circulated or displayed in public only with the person's permission
(subject to exceptions, see § 23). Meanwhile, § 12 of the German Civil Code (BGB) re-
quires permission for the use of one's name only "if the interests of the person entitled to
the name are harmed." See W. Van Caenegem, Different Approaches to the Protection of
Celebrities Against Unauthorized Use of Their Image in Advertising in Australia, the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany. 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 452, 456 nn. 23-
24 (1990).
119. See Stuart Elliott, Airbus Apologizes for Using a Photo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995,
at C13 (Airbus Industrie apologizing to Sir Roger Bannister, the first man to run an under-
four-minute mile, for using in an ad a photo of him running as part of a catalog of great
achievements (Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, the Golden Gate Bridge, and Airbus's own
story)). The use of the photo made the plaintiffs case stronger than if Airbus had simply
listed Bannister's record (and name). That would have made the case similar to Abdul-
Jabbar, but arguably without the suggestion of endorsement or sponsorship. If Airbus had
listed some other great athletic records as well, its defense would have looked pretty
strong.
120. McCarthy Lecture, supra note 1, at 137.
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readily adapted to support a parody defense to the right of public-
ity.121 The presence of parody helps to create a new work; it is "trans-
formative." The "commerciality" of the use can be judged by how
closely the celebrity is linked to the product or the sale-not very
closely, one would think, in White, 22 or in the case of the white Bron-
cos subject to plea-bargaining, 123 or in the take-off on Watergate that
(naturally) evokes Bob Woodward.124 The "nature of the celebrity"
then can take account of the celebrity's public role-as a political fig-
ure, for example, or as the protagonist in such a ubiquitous topic as
the Simpson trial. The "amount taken" of the celebrity may be defen-
sible if it is no more than necessary to "call up" the celebrity as the
target of the parody, or if it consists largely of the "generic" role or
activity the celebrity has come to represent. 25 The latter considera-
tion should have protected, for example, a billboard bovine diving for
sunken treasure as "Jacques Cowsteau.' 1 26 And since the celebrity
ordinarily would not license a parody, the speech would be lost unless
fair use was allowed, and the competitive impact on the celebrity's
own licensing market will often be weak.
To parody or spoof a celebrity in an ad thus may or may not be
fair use, depending on the facts, but the possibility of such protection
should not be ruled out.
V
Conclusion
I conclude that Professor McCarthy is wrong to reject any de-
fense of fair use, and virtually any First Amendment defense, to right-
of-publicity claims based on product advertising. This is "commercial
speech," which the Supreme Court has said the First Amendment pro-
tects. The Ninth Circuit likewise is wrong to have dismissed such a
defense for the parody ad in White without applying the Supreme
Court's test, and to have entirely ignored the question of commercial
speech in dealing with the sports statistic in Abdul-Jabbar. Speech in
121. See generally Michael E. Hartmann & Daniel R. Kelly, Parody (of Celebrities, in
Advertising), Parity (Between Advertising and Other Types of Commercial Speech), and (the
Property Right of) Publicity, 17 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 633 (1995).
122. Samsung's VCR would be used to tape, not Vanna White, but the robot that re-
placed her.
123. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 21.
125. As Judge Kozinski pointed out, "A commercial with an astronaut setting foot on
the moon would evoke the image of Neil Armstrong." White, 989 F.2d at 1515-16 n.8
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
126. It didn't. Sued by Cousteau, the advertiser quickly took the billboard down and
settled. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 655 n.152.
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advertising may be less protected than other speech, but it is not be-
yond the First Amendment pale. Proponents of the right of publicity
should recognize that this tort requires a First Amendment defense-
even for advertising-and focus on the difficult task of developing
one.
